Lt. Col. Robert Maginnis (ret.)
Israeli intelligence has identified Iran’s Fordow nuclear facility as the center of its covert atomic weapons program
Beneath the rugged face of Mount Alvand near the religious city of Qom lies the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant—an underground stronghold and centerpiece of Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Though presented as a civilian facility, Fordow is widely believed by Israeli intelligence to be the probable heart of Tehran’s covert atomic weapons effort.
For years, the Islamic Republic has played a dangerous game—enriching uranium just below weapons-grade, obstructing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) oversight, and using regional instability as a shield for its ambitions. While Israel has confronted nuclear threats before, it lacks the bunker-busting capability to neutralize Fordow. That responsibility now falls to the United States. The case for destroying Fordow is not only strong—it is urgent.
Fordow: The Core of Iran’s Nuclear Calculus
Iran’s nuclear infrastructure includes various sites: Natanz, which is more exposed; Arak, partly repurposed; and Esfahan and Parchin, both key research locations. But Fordow stands apart. It is buried under nearly 80 meters of rock and hosts advanced IR-6 centrifuges capable of enriching uranium at accelerated rates. The site is engineered to survive conventional airstrikes and represents Iran’s strategic bet on invulnerability.
Western intelligence exposed Fordow in 2009 after years of concealment. Prime Minister Netanyahu warned that Iran’s leaders “have backed up their genocidal rhetoric with a nuclear weapons program,” and cautioned, “if not stopped, Iran could produce a nuclear weapon in a very short time. It could be a year. It could be within a few months, less than a year.” While he told Business Insider that Israel’s strike hit “the core of Iran’s nuclear weaponization infrastructure,” he acknowledged that Israel “lacks the heavy bunker-busting munitions” needed to destroy sites like Fordow.
IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi confirmed in 2024 that Iran now possesses enough uranium enriched to 60%—a technical heartbeat away from weapons-grade levels—to build several nuclear devices. He warned that the IAEA lacked sufficient transparency in Iran’s nuclear activities and cautioned that “without full Iranian cooperation, the agency cannot verify that its program is peaceful.”
A Pattern of Deception—and Alarm
In 2018, Mossad operatives seized 55,000 documents from a Tehran warehouse revealing a covert nuclear weapons program known as “Project Amad.” David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security assessed the material as “clear evidence that Iran intended to produce five nuclear weapons.”
Despite the JCPOA framework, Iran continues nuclear-related activity at undeclared sites—Turquzabad, Marivan, and Varamin—where IAEA inspectors have found traces of nuclear material without explanation. These discoveries point to a sustained weapons agenda.
How the U.S. Would Strike—and Why It Must
The U.S. military possesses the capability to neutralize Fordow. The GBU-57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP)—a 30,000-pound bunker-buster—is designed for hardened targets like Fordow. Dropped from a B-2 Spirit stealth bomber, it can penetrate 60 feet of reinforced concrete or hundreds of feet of soil and rock. Multiple MOPs delivered in a precision, double-tap pattern could collapse Fordow’s structure entirely.
A strike package would likely include:
- Stealth B-2 bomber infiltration from bases such as Whiteman AFB or Diego Garcia;
- Electronic suppression of Iranian air defenses;
- Real-time satellite and drone ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance);
- Follow-on cruise missile strikes as necessary.
But the mission cannot stop at detonation. The United States must insist on independent verification that Fordow is irreparably disabled. This could include IAEA inspection—if permitted—or the use of American intelligence capabilities to gather imagery, seismic data, and on-ground confirmation. A successful strike means little unless the world can verify the result.
Osirak Revisited: Lessons from 1981
In 1981, Israel destroyed Iraq’s Osirak reactor in Operation Opera. Then-Prime Minister Menachem Begin stated, “Never again will we allow an enemy to develop weapons of mass destruction against the Jewish people.” Although initially condemned, the strike was later vindicated when the Gulf War revealed Saddam Hussein’s persistent nuclear ambitions.
The U.S. now stands where Israel once stood—facing a critical threat with limited time. Delay may allow Iran to build a bomb, fortify alternative sites, or export nuclear know-how to its proxies in Lebanon, Syria, or Yemen.
What If We Don’t Strike?
Opponents of military action argue it could spark a regional war, drive up oil prices, or embolden Iran’s hardliners. Those are serious risks—but not greater than allowing a fanatical regime to field nuclear weapons. Iran has already threatened retaliation, but its escalation capacity is checked by economic fragility, internal dissent, and the specter of overwhelming U.S. retaliation.
